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SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND WISCONSIN
SPORTS LAW JURISPRUDENCE
MATTHEW J. MITTEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article identifies, synthesizes, and explains the significant contributions that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin federal and state courts have made to the rapidly developing body of
American sports law jurisprudence. It focuses on legal regulation of high
school, college, Olympic, and professional sports as well as sports-related intellectual property and tort issues.1 A threshold issue is what constitutes a “sport”
from the perspective of participants and spectators, an important determination
for purposes of the evolving judicial common law regulation and interpretation
of statutory authorities. The Wisconsin Supreme Court broadly defined “sport”
as “‘[a]n activity involving physical exertion and skill that is governed by a set
of rules or customs,” which encompasses high school cheerleading.2 Consistent

*Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute and LL.M. in Sports Law Program
for Foreign Lawyers. I acknowledge and appreciate the excellent research assistance and initial drafting
of the Torts Issues section of this article by Ethan Sebert, Marquette University Law School Class of
2015.
1
Other interesting Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin sports-related cases involve a wide array of areas
of law such as tax law, see Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572, 573–74 (7th Cir. 1984) (After becoming
part owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, Bud Selig properly allocated $10.2 million of the $10.8 million
purchase price of the Seattle Pilots to the value of the 149 players’ contracts acquired as part of purchase
of club.); NFL player contract interpretation, see Tollefson v. Green Bay Packers, Inc., 41 N.W.2d
201, 202–03 (Wis. 1950) (under terms of contract player was to receive a minimum of $3,600 regardless
of whether or not he participated in games played where he was not discharged for cause); Johnson v.
Green Bay Packers, Inc., 74 N.W.2d 784, 790–91 (Wis. 1956) (contract provision referring all matters
in dispute to arbitration inapplicable to player’s claim against the club for failing to pay him); sports
gambling, see United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendant convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States by assisting a sports wagering enterprise and money laundering);
and federal constitutional law, see Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1033–34, 1040, 1045–
46 (7th Cir. 2002) (Chicago ordinance prohibiting peddling of books within 1,000 feet of sports stadium
impermissibly infringes free speech rights of peddler desiring to sell a book critical of sports club owner
whose team plays in stadium).
2
Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶ 17, 315 Wis.2d 350, 364–65, 760 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Wis. 2009)
(quoting AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1742 (3d ed. 1992)) (construing
Wisconsin co-participant tort immunity statute). But see Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85,
105 (2d Cir. 2012) (cheerleading is not a sport for purposes of athletic participation opportunities under
Title IX).
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with other jurisdictions, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a spectator is entitled only
to “‘view whatever event transpire[s]’”3 and has no right to a sports event that
is “exciting” or during which participants “competed well.”4
II. HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS
The Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin courts have developed a significant
body of high school sports law jurisprudence, most of which is consistent with
other jurisdictions. There are, however, some important, unresolved issues, as
well as a few leading cases that, over time, may influence the development of
the law governing high school athletics in states outside the Seventh Circuit.
To date, there has been no judicial determination whether the respective
governing bodies for high school sports in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin are a
state actor,5 whose rules, decisions, and conduct is subject to the constraints of
the U.S. Constitution pursuant to Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass’n.6 In Brentwood Academy, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the “nominally private character of the [Tennessee Secondary School Athletic] Association [(TSSAA)] is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of
public institutions and public officials in its composition and workings.”7 The
Court concluded the TSSAA is a state actor because the requisite entwinement
with the State of Tennessee exists.8 Although the state did not create the TSSAA
or fund its operations,9 public schools constituted 84% of its membership, state
board of education members served ex officio on its board of control and legislative council, and its ministerial employees are eligible to participate in the
state retirement system.10 The state board of education also permitted students
to satisfy its physical education requirement by participating in athletics sponsored by the TSSAA.11
Prior to the 2001 Brentwood Academy ruling, the Seventh Circuit held that

Bowers v. Fed’n Internationale de L’Automobile, 489 F.3d 316, 321–22 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Castillo v. Tyson, 701 N.Y.S.2d 423, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (six-car competition does not deprive
plaintiffs of contractual right to see a Formula One race).
4
Id. at 322.
5
In Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., the parties stipulated the WIAA is a
state actor, making it unnecessary for this issue to be judicially determined before resolving the merits
of the First Amendment claims in this case. 658 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).
6
531 U.S. 288 (2001).
7
Id. at 298.
8
Id. at 291.
9
Id. at 307 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10
Id. at 291, 300.
11
Id. at 301.
3
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the Illinois High School Association (IHSA) is a state actor because of the
“overwhelmingly public character” of its member schools, 85% of which are
public schools.12 In a case in which the panel majority did not address this issue,
Judge Posner concluded that the Indiana High School Athletic Association
(IHSAA), whose membership is “composed primarily of public schools,” is a
state actor.13 A Wisconsin federal district court denied the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (WIAA) motion to dismiss a complaint alleging its
violation of a student’s federal constitutional rights because the WIAA’s “direct
influence upon the school's athletic programs” makes it “clear that the [WIAA
is] . . . functioning ‘under color of’ state law.”14
After Brentwood Academy, in Bukowski v. Wisconsin Interscholastic
Athletic Ass’n,15 a Wisconsin court of appeals ruled that the plaintiff did not
prove the WIAA is a state actor because he offered no evidence of “extensive
entwinement” between the Wisconsin State Board of Education or public
schools and the WIAA.16 The court observed that the WIAA is not a state actor
even if it received federal funds, which is alone insufficient to establish state
action.17 However, this unpublished opinion has no precedential authority. Because virtually all Wisconsin public schools with interscholastic athletic programs are a member of the WIAA (and collectively constitute a majority of its
members), and their principals and administrators probably are extensively involved in its rule-making and decision-making authority, the WIAA is likely to
be judicially found to be a state actor when record evidence of “extensive entwinement” with its member public schools is established.
Wisconsin courts and the Seventh Circuit have expressed a reluctance to
interfere judicially with the contractual relationship between a state high school
athletic association and its member schools. In School District of Slinger v.
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, a Wisconsin appellate court held that
the WIAA’s constitution, bylaws, and rules establish a contract between the
WIAA and its member schools.18 Because these documents gave the WIAA’s
Board of Control “unfettered power” with “no effort to limit that authority with

12
Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Menora v.
Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1032 (7th Cir. 1982) (IHSA does not contest the district court’s
ruling that it is a state actor on appeal, so “there is no issue of state action before us.”).
13
Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1326 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., dissenting).
14
Leffel v. Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 398 F. Supp. 749, 750 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
15
2007 WI App 1, 298 Wis. 2d 246, 726 N.W.2d 356.
16
Id. at ¶¶ 10–11.
17
Id. at ¶ 11.
18
563 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
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any strict criteria”19 when aligning athletic conferences, it rejected a member
school’s allegation that the Board breached its implied contractual right to a
“‘reasonable’” conference affiliation.20 The court concluded “the WIAA constitution, by-laws and rules on conference realignment do not provide individual
members with a contractual right to a ‘reasonable’ conference alignment.”21
In Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Ass’n,22 the Seventh Circuit
rejected a private, religious school’s claims that the IHSA’s new transfer rules,
which bar transfer students from participating in interscholastic athletics for one
year unless their parents changed residence from one school district to another,
but makes an exception for students who transfer from a private to public school
if no undue influence is involved, violate the equal protection and due process
clauses.23 Because the transfer rules are facially neutral and do not burden the
free exercise of religion or the right of parents to educate their children, the court
applied a rational basis test to both claims.24 It found the transfer rules rationally
furthered the IHSA’s legitimate objective of placing “public schools on an equal
footing with private schools with regard to student recruitment, without abandoning the goal of preventing undue influence on transfer students”25 and do not
deny equal protection of the law.26
The Griffin court concluded the transfer rules do not violate the school’s
due process rights:
As an IHSA member, Griffin was free to submit amendments
or proposals to the association. It has not done so, and according to the IHSA, Griffin has never attended meetings of the legislative body of the IHSA. Griffin received the process that was
due: notice of the proposed regulation and the right to participate in the IHSA decisionmaking [sic] process through fair and
democratic procedures.27
There are no published federal or state cases resolving disputes between the

19

Id. at 591.
Id. at 588, 591.
21
Id. at 591.
22
822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
23
Id. at 673–74.
24
Id. at 674–76.
25
Id. at 675.
26
Id. at 676.
27
Id.
20
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WIAA and high school athletes. There are, however, a few cases in which the
Seventh Circuit decided claims brought by high school athletes against the
IHSA or IHSAA. Although it is difficult to make any broad generalizations
based on such a small number of cases, it is notable that the court recognizes
that participation in interscholastic athletics is an important part of a student’s
high school education and has affirmed the granting of injunctive relief to enable athletic participation in appropriate cases.
Crane v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n is one of the rare federal appellate court cases finding that a state high school athletic association applied
its athlete eligibility rules in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of
state private association laws.28 In Crane, applying Indiana law, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction prohibiting the Indiana
High School Athletic Association (IHSAA) from declaring a student who
moved from one divorced parent’s residence to the other’s residence, thereby
requiring him to change public schools, ineligible to play varsity sports at his
new school for one year.29 The decision to have him move to live with his father
was made by his parents based on their belief that the move was in his best
interests.30 It was undisputed that this move was not motivated by any athletics
reasons.31 Finding that the rule was “poorly drafted,” with important terms
“conspicuously undefined,” the court determined “the IHSAA is attempting to
find definitions for those phrases that will allow it to declare Ryan, and others
like him, ineligible—regardless of whether his transfer was athletically motivated.”32 Observing that the student appeared to be eligible pursuant to another
part of the rule, it stated, “The IHSAA’s inconsistency is aggravated by the fact
that it does not publish any type of written opinion or reasoning for its eligibility
decisions to member schools.”33 The majority ruled the IHSAA’s interpretation
and application of its transfer student eligibility rule to the plaintiff was arbitrary
and capricious in violation of Indiana law.34
Crane is significant because it requires state high school athletic association
975 F.2d 1315, 1326 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1317–18.
30
Id. at 1317.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 1325.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1326. Thus, the majority did not consider “whether the rules run afoul of [federal] equal
protection or due process and express[ed] no opinion on these issues,” as the district court had ruled.
Id. In dissent, Judge Posner expressed concern that the majority’s ruling based on state private association law would “subject to fish-eyed scrutiny by federal judges applying a vague norm of reasonableness,” “every interpretation, every application, of every such rule—that could be thought to interfere
with the family, or rather with a particular family.” Id. at 1327 (Posner, J., dissenting).
28
29
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eligibility rules to be clear and unambiguous, reasonably interpreted in light of
their legitimate objectives, and consistently applied.35 It also suggests that the
governing body’s rules, interpretations, and applications should be published to
provide guidance to its member schools, students, and parents.36 Moreover, this
case recognizes that “participation in competitive high school athletics ha[s]
emotional and psychological benefits that [can] not easily be quantified” and
“money damages [may] not adequately compensate [a student] for the lost opportunity to [participate] in the state” championship competition, thereby justifying permanent injunctive relief in appropriate cases. 37
In Washington v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a preliminary injunction enjoining the IHSAA from enforcing its “eight
semester” rule and denying a learning disabled student from playing interscholastic basketball during the second semester of the 1998–1999 school year. 38
Pursuant to this rule, a student is automatically ineligible to participate in any
interscholastic sports after eight semesters from his first day of high school enrollment even if the student was not enrolled for the full eight semesters.39 The
plaintiff had temporarily dropped out of high school because of his learning
disability during this eight-semester period.40
Applying the federal disability discrimination laws,41 the court concluded
an individualized inquiry is necessary to determine if waiver of this rule is a
required reasonable accommodation of his learning disability, or a fundamental
alteration of its eight semester rule the IHSAA is not required to make.42 It ruled
that permitting the student to play basketball is a reasonable accommodation
that would not fundamentally alter the rule’s legitimate objectives of “promoting competitive equity, protecting students’ safety, creating opportunities for

See id. at 1325. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit explained that “for a student athlete in public
school, membership in IHSAA is not voluntary, and actions of the IHSAA arguably should be held to
a stricter standard of judicial review” than those of a private sport governing body that does not have
monolithic regulatory authority. Freeman v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 51 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir.
1995).
36
See Crane, 975 F.2.at 1325.
37
Id. at 1326.
38
181 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1999).
39
Id. at 852.
40
Id.
41
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012); Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012).
42
Washington, 181 F.3d at 851–52. This determination is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
subsequent ruling that a sports governing body’s refusal to consider an athlete’s personal circumstances
“in deciding whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the clear language and purpose of
the ADA.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001).
35
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younger students,” and ensuring academics are paramount to athletics.43 The
court observed that “waiver of the rule in [plaintiff’s] case has promoted his
education” because he “reentered [sic] school because of basketball, has improved his grades in part due to the influence of basketball and his coach, and
is even considering going to college.”44
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has not been as receptive to athletes’
claims that a state high school athletic association violated their federal constitutional rights. In Menora v. Illinois High School Ass’n, the panel majority vacated a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IHSA from preventing orthodox
Jewish males from playing basketball while wearing yarmulkes on their heads.45
Adopting a test that balances the students’ religious liberty interests and benefits
of playing interscholastic basketball with the IHSA’s safety concerns, it ruled
the plaintiffs did not satisfy “the burden of proving that their First Amendment
rights were infringed by the [IHSA’s] no-headwear rule,”46 despite the lack of
any documented cases of a fall caused by a falling yarmulke.47 However, the
majority ordered the district court to retain jurisdiction to provide plaintiffs with
“an opportunity to propose to the [IHSA] a form of secure head covering that
complies with Jewish law yet meets [its] safety concerns.”48
Similarly, it is difficult for athletes to prevail on claims asserting that a public high school, which is a state actor, violated their federal constitutional rights.
Although public schools must not infringe their due process, equal protection,
First Amendment (e.g., freedom of association, expression, and religious liberty), Fourth Amendment (freedom from unreasonable searches), and other protected rights, high school athletes have been successful in relatively few Seventh
Circuit or Wisconsin federal district court cases—which is consistent with the
sports law jurisprudence of other circuit courts.
Although there is no constitutional liberty or property right to participate in
interscholastic sports,49 in Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin School District,50 a

43

Washington, 181 F.3d at 842, 852.
Id. at 852.
45
683 F.2d 1030, 1031–32, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982).
46
Id. at 1035.
47
Id. at 1034.
48
Id. at 1035. Dissenting, Judge Cudahy concluded the district court “properly resolved the question
before him in favor of the plaintiffs” and stated, “[T]he effective foreclosure of the plaintiffs from
interscholastic basketball—their schools’ only interscholastic sport—is a significant, if not severe, burden and deprivation.” Id. at 1037 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
49
Smith v. Chippewa Falls Area Unified Sch. Dist., 302 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
50
116 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1056 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (denying student’s request for a preliminary injunction); 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1128 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (granting and denying in part school’s motion for
summary judgment).
44
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Wisconsin federal court recognized that “the opportunity to participate in high
school extracurricular activities is a valuable part of a complete educational experience.”51 It found a “reasonable likelihood” that a student who was allowed
to participate in high school athletics “had a legitimate expectation—and thus
an entitlement—created by independent state sources, of being allowed to continue participating so long as he adhered to the terms of the [school’s] Athletic
Code and other pertinent rules and regulations.”52 Thus, the student has a property right in continued sports participation that can be taken away only if a public school provides appropriate due process.53
Butler upheld the authority of high schools to sanction athletes for misconduct outside of school hours and off campus, if necessary, to maintain appropriate standards of conduct and student decorum.54 It establishes a comprehensive
framework for analyzing whether a school has satisfied the procedural due process requirements to prevent a student from participating in interscholastic athletics as a disciplinary sanction for violating its athletic code and other applicable rules.55 Prior to suspending a student from athletic participation, a school
must provide notice of the specific rule and conduct that violates it,56 as well as
“the opportunity to give his side of the story,” although a hearing is not required.57 After a suspension from participation in athletics, “a prompt hearing
and a prompt decision without appreciable delay”58 before an impartial decision-maker is required.59 The court held that the participation of the school’s
athletic director, who had imposed the suspension, in the deliberations of the
Coaches’ Council, which had conducted the hearing, violated due process.60
The hearing body’s decision must be based on evidence proving it was, at least,
more likely than not the student violated the particular rule,61 which, according

51

Butler, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
Id. at 1049.
53
Id. at 1045, 1049.
54
Id. at 1056.
55
Id. at 1050–55.
56
Butler v. Oak Creek Franklin Sch. Dist., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (citing Riggan v. Midland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 658 (W.D. Tex. 2000)).
57
Butler, 116 F. Supp.2d at 1051–52.
58
Id. at 1053.
59
Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1119. Implicitly applying these requirements, another Wisconsin federal court concluded,
52

The undisputed facts establish that plaintiff was afforded procedural due process. He was
allowed to engage in “give-and-take” with the school administrators investigating his case
at the initial investigation stage and at all levels of appeal provided for in the athletic code.
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to the court, must be more than simply being arrested, pleading no contest, or
remaining silent about the charged offense.62 Even if the student admits the rule
violation, he must be given an opportunity to be heard regarding the appropriate
discipline and any mitigating factors justifying a reduction in the length of suspension from athletic participation.63
Public schools cannot violate substantive due process by requiring a student
to forego a constitutionally protected liberty interest in order to participate in
interscholastic athletics. However, only fundamental liberty rights such as those
expressly enumerated in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights and a limited category
of non-enumerated rights will trigger more than rational basis judicial scrutiny.64 For example, in Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Community School
Corp.,65 the Seventh Circuit ruled that, although “the manner in which [a student] wears his hair is a cognizable aspect of personal liberty . . . . [It] is not a
fundamental right.”66 Therefore, a high school’s hair policy for athletes is subject to only very deferential rational basis judicial scrutiny.67
Although high school athletes have privacy rights that constitute a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, the Seventh Circuit
has ruled they have a diminished expectation of privacy, which gives public
schools significant latitude in implementing drug testing programs. In Schaill
v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., the Seventh Circuit upheld random, suspicionless testing for recreational drugs as a condition of participation in interscholastic athletics. 68 The court determined that suspicionless taking and testing of athletes’ urine along with limited disclosure to school officials implicated

Defendants presented the evidence upon which they reached their determination and plaintiff was permitted to respond to that evidence and to give his own version of the facts.
Although plaintiff may believe that defendants’ athletic code is draconian, nothing in the
undisputed facts supports an inference that defendants’ decision to suspend plaintiff from
athletic competition was arbitrary and capricious, as plaintiff argues.

Smith v. Chippewa Falls Area Unified Sch. Dist., 302 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
62
Butler, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1123–27.
63
Id. at 1113–15.
64
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (The Supreme Court has characterized “the
rights to marry, . . . to have children, . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children, . . .
to marital privacy, . . . to use contraception, . . . to bodily integrity, . . . and to abortion” as fundamental
liberty rights.).
65
743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2014).
66
Id. at 575–76.
67
Id. at 576.
68
864 F.2d 1309, 1310, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988).

MITTEN FORMATTED FINAL

216

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/23/2014 1:39 PM

[Vol. 25:1

their privacy interests, but “‘communal undress’ inherent in athletic participation,” required physical exams, and extensive regulation of interscholastic
sports creates “reduced expectations of privacy.”69 The school’s interests in
protecting athletes’ health and safety outweighed this limited infringement of
their privacy rights.70 According to the court, “[b]ecause of their high visibility
and leadership roles, it is not unreasonable to single out athletes . . . for special
attention with respect to drug usage,”71 which does not violate their due process
and Fourth Amendment rights. Applying a similar balancing test, the Supreme
Court subsequently upheld the constitutionality of random drug testing of high
school athletes for recreational drugs.72
The Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin courts have rejected athletes’ equal protection claims against public school districts alleging unequal treatment of individuals on the playing field. In O’Connor v. Board of Education,73 the Seventh
Circuit held that athletic conference rules requiring separate teams for boys and
girls in contact sports does not violate the equal protection rights of a girl who
wanted to play on the boys’ team.74 It determined that “[s]eparate but equal”
teams are substantially related to the important governmental objective of maximizing interscholastic sports participation by both genders.75 In N.T. ex rel.
Tabbert v. School District of Westfield,76 a Wisconsin federal district court rejected the claim of a female basketball player that her coach’s yelling at her
more than other girls on the team and benching her violated her equal protection
rights.77 Applying rational basis standard, because no gender discrimination
was alleged, the court upheld the coach’s discretionary decisions regarding
“how best to coach her team” and to achieve her legitimate goal of winning
games rather than giving each member the same amount of playing time.78
By contrast, courts have been more receptive to challenges to rules regulating athletes’ off-field conduct that results in gender discrimination. In Hayden
v. Greenburg Community School Corp., the Seventh Circuit held the boys’ basketball coach’s hair-length policy, which required boys to have shorter hair than

69

Id. at 1318.
Id. at 1321.
71
Id. at 1320.
72
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650, 652–53, 665 (1995).
73
645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981).
74
Id. at 579, 582.
75
Id. at 581.
76
No. 11–CV–00556, 2013 WL 1191903 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 21, 2013).
77
Id. at *4–5.
78
Id.
70
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players on the girls’ basketball team, violated the boys’ equal protection rights.79
The coach’s policy imitated the one established by legendary basketball coach
John Wooden and required boys’ hair to be cut above the collar, ears, and eyebrows to promote team unity and a “‘clean cut’” image.80 The court characterized this policy, which burdened boys more than girls, as a form of gender discrimination that requires an “exceedingly persuasive” justification (i.e.,
important interest) that is substantially furthered by the policy.81 Although “sexdifferentiated standards consistent with community norms . . . part of a comprehensive, evenly-enforced grooming code that imposes comparable burdens on
both males and females alike”82 would satisfy this standard, the panel majority
found “no rational, let alone exceedingly persuasive, justification . . . for restricting the hair length of male athletes alone.”83
Following other courts,84 the Seventh Circuit has held that unequal treatment of female high school athletes compared to boys playing the same sport
may violate Title IX’s prohibition against gender discrimination in athletic programs offered by schools receiving federal funds.85 In Parker v. Franklin
County Community School Corp.,86 the court ruled that several Indiana public
high schools’ longstanding tradition of scheduling significantly more boys’ varsity basketball games on weekend nights than girls’ basketball games is substantial enough to deny equal athletic opportunities on a program-wide basis by

79

743 F.3d 569, 572, 582 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 572, 584.
81
Id. at 579–80, 582.
82
Id. at 581.
83
Id. at 582. It observed that the challenged “policy prohibits far more than an Age-of-Aquarius,
Tiny-Tim, hair-crawling-past-the-shoulders sort of hair style—it compels all male basketball players to
wear genuinely short hair,” and that “one or two men on this court might find themselves in trouble
with [the coach] for hair over the ears.” Id. at 581–82. Dissenting, Judge Manion observed that the
school’s athletic code provision regarding hair styles is the same for all female and male athletes except
for hair length, and that “[r]equiring men, but not women, to keep their hair at a certain length has never
been held to be unequally burdensome.” Id. at 586 (Manion, J., dissenting).
84
McCormick ex rel. Geldwert v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 280, 302 (2d Cir. 2004)
(season scheduling decisions that deprived girls, but not boys, of opportunity to compete in regional
and state championships violated Title IX); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 178
F.Supp.2d 805, 807, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2001), aff’d on appeal, 459 F.3d 676, 695 (6th Cir. 2006) (high
school athletic association violated equal protection rights of female student-athletes by scheduling
athletic seasons and tournaments for girls’ sports during less advantageous times of academic year than
boys’ athletic seasons).
85
Parker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2012). See also Title IX
provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2013).
86
See generally Parker, 667 F.3d 910.
80
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disadvantaging girls basketball players, absent any offsetting, comparably better
treatment of female athletes than male athletes in any other aspects of their athletic programs.87 For example, during the 2009–10 season, 95% of the boys’
games, but only 53% of the girls’ games, were scheduled on Friday and Saturday nights, which attracted much larger crowds, accompanied by cheerleaders
and the pep band in an exciting, supportive environment.88 This disparity negatively impacted the girls’ basketball players, resulting in disproportionate academic burdens (i.e., less time to do homework), a smaller audience of spectators,
and feelings of inferiority because of their much larger number of weekday
games.89 The court recognized “these harms are not insignificant and may have
the effect of discouraging girls from participating in sports in contravention of
the purposes of Title IX.”90
III. COLLEGE SPORTS
There is a dearth of significant Wisconsin cases regarding intercollegiate
athletics, but the Seventh Circuit has decided several important cases that define
the legal relationship between a university and its student-athletes as well as
apply federal civil rights (e.g., Title IX, Rehabilitation Act of 1972) and antitrust
laws to college sports.
Consistent with other jurisdictions,91 in Ross v. Creighton University,92
the Seventh Circuit recognized there is a contractual relationship between a university and its student-athletes consisting of written and oral promises that may
be both express and implied.93 Applying Illinois law, the court ruled that a student-athlete alleging a breach of contract claim “must point to an identifiable . .
. promise” the university failed to honor.94 Although a university’s decision to
admit an academically deficient student-athlete and the general quality of education it provides are not subject to judicial review for policy reasons,95 the court

87

Id. at 914, 922, 924.
Id. at 914.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 923.
91
See, e.g., Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991); Taylor v. Wake
Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. App. 1972).
92
957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
93
Id. at 416–17 (citing Zumbrun v. Univ. of Southern Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (1972); Wickstrom v. N. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d 155, 157 (Idaho 1986)).
94
Id. at 416–17.
95
Id. at 415. The court observed there is no “satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an
educator,” “inherent uncertainties . . . about the cause and nature of damages,” a potential “flood of
litigation against schools,” and concern about judicial oversight of “the day-to-day operations of
88
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concluded a university’s alleged failure to perform a promised service states a
breach of contract claim:
We read Mr. Ross’ complaint to allege more than a failure of
the University to provide him with an education of a certain
quality. Rather, he alleges that the University knew that he was
not qualified academically to participate in its curriculum.
Nevertheless, it made a specific promise that he would be able
to participate in a meaningful way in that program because it
would provide certain specific services to him. Finally, he alleges that the University breached its promise by reneging on
its commitment to provide those services and, consequently, effectively cutting him off from any participation in and benefit
from the University’s academic program. To adjudicate such a
claim, the court would not be required to determine whether
Creighton had breached its contract with Mr. Ross by providing
deficient academic services. Rather, its inquiry would be limited to whether the University had provided any real access to
its academic curriculum at all.96
Ross, however, cautioned that “courts should not ‘take on the job of supervising the relationship between colleges and student-athletes or creating in
effect a new relationship between them.’”97 This view is consistent with general
reluctance of courts to expand the nature and scope of contractual obligations a
university owes to student-athletes beyond the express terms of an athletic
scholarship and any specific oral promises it has made.98
When applying federal civil rights statutes, the Seventh Circuit has been
very deferential to the authority of a university to operate its intercollegiate athletics program and to determine the individual sports it offers as well as the
eligibility requirements for its student-athletes.
As have all other federal appellate courts,99 the Seventh Circuit has rejected claims that elimination of male intercollegiate teams violates Title IX and
schools.” Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
96
Id. at 417.
97
Id. (citation omitted).
98
See, e.g., Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (Student-athlete’s
“financial aid agreements do not implicitly contain a right to play basketball.”).
99
See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2002);
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Neal, 198 F.3d at 769–
70); Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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denies equal protection of the law. In Kelley v. Board of Trustees, University of
Illinois,100 the Seventh Circuit upheld the University of Illinois’ decision to
eliminate its men’s swimming team (as well as two other men’s teams and one
women’s team) for budgetary reasons and to comply with Title IX’s requirement that equal athletic participation opportunities be provided for both genders.101 It found that eliminating the men’s swimming team does not violate
Title IX because men’s intercollegiate athletic participation opportunities at the
university would continue to be more than substantially proportionate to their
undergraduate enrollment.102 On the other hand, the court concluded the university’s decision to retain its women’s swimming program is a valid, reasonable response necessary to ensure women have substantially proportionate athletic participation opportunities pursuant to Title IX.103 The court ruled that
cutting men’s sports to comply with Title IX does not deny male athletes equal
protection of the law because remedying discrimination in the provision of intercollegiate athletic participation opportunities is an important government objective that is furthered by complying with Title IX’s substantial proportionality
compliance test.104
Rejecting the male athletes’ assertion that Title IX requires athletic participation opportunities for the underrepresented gender to be increased rather
than reducing those for the overrepresented gender, the Seventh Circuit explained:
Title IX’s stated objective is not to ensure that the athletic opportunities available to women increase. Rather its avowed
purpose is to prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex. And the remedial scheme established
by Title IX and the applicable regulation and policy interpretation are clearly substantially related to this end.105
Similarly, in Boulahanis v. Board of Regents, the Seventh Circuit held
that Illinois State University’s elimination of its men’s wrestling and soccer
teams solely to comply with Title IX by providing substantially proportionate

100

35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 269–72.
102
Id. at 270.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 272–73.
105
Id. at 272.
101
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athletic participation opportunities for both its female and male students does
not constitute prohibited gender discrimination. 106 Rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt
to distinguish Kelley on the ground there is a legally dispositive difference between eliminating athletic teams for financial reasons rather than gender, the
court stated:
That distinction ignores the fact that a university’s decision as
to which athletic programs to offer necessarily entails budgetary considerations. . . . To say that one decision is financial,
while another is sex-based, assumes that these two aspects can
be neatly separated. They cannot. . . . Ultimately, both the decision of the University in this case and the decision of the University of Illinois at issue in Kelley were based on a combination of financial and sex-based concerns that are not easily
distinguished.107
In Knapp v. Northwestern University,108 the Seventh Circuit ruled that a
university has valid authority to establish reasonable medical eligibility requirements that its student-athletes must satisfy as a condition of being eligible to
participate in its intercollegiate athletics program.109 In a landmark case applying the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to college athletics, the court held that requiring student-athletes to be medically cleared by a university’s team physician is
a legitimate physical qualification for participation in intercollegiate sports.110
Northwestern University refused to permit a student who had suffered cardiac
arrest while playing competitive basketball and was medically disqualified by
its team physician from playing on its intercollegiate basketball team.111
Although other physicians medically cleared him to play intercollegiate
basketball, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the university’s decision does not
violate the Rehabilitation Act, which permits a person with a physical disability
to be excluded from participation in an activity to prevent “a significant risk of
personal physical injury.”112 The court characterized its judicial role narrowly:

106

198 F.3d 633, 636–38 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 637.
108
101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996).
109
Id. at 482 (quoting Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979)).
110
Id. at 484.
111
Id. at 476–77.
112
Id. at 483 (citing Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991); Bentivegna
v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982)).
107
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“[I]n the midst of conflicting expert testimony regarding the degree of serious
risk of harm or death, the court’s place is to ensure that the exclusion or disqualification . . . was individualized, reasonably made, and based upon competent
medical evidence.”113 The court explained that “medical determinations of this
sort are best left to team doctors and universities as long as they are made with
reason and rationality and with full regard to possible and reasonable accommodations.”114 However, it stated, “[W]e are not saying Northwestern’s decision necessarily is the right decision,” and acknowledged, “all universities need
not evaluate risk the same way.”115
Consistent with other federal appellate courts,116 the Seventh Circuit has
given the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) broad latitude to
preserve the “amateur” nature of intercollegiate athletics by holding that student-athlete eligibility rules are per se legal and do not violate federal antitrust
law. In Banks v. NCAA, the majority rejected an antitrust challenge to two
NCAA amateurism rules that render college football players ineligible if they
declare for the NFL draft or agree to be represented by an agent in the sport of
football. 117 It affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because it did not allege
the rule had anti-competitive effects in an identifiable relevant market.118 Finding that “the no-draft rule and other like NCAA regulations preserve the bright
line of demarcation between college and ‘play for pay’ football,”119 the majority
concluded:
The no-draft rule has no more impact on the market for college
football players than other NCAA eligibility requirements such
as grades, semester hours carried, or requiring a high school
diploma. They all constitute eligibility requirements essential
to participation in NCAA sponsored amateur athletic competition. . . . Banks’ allegation that the no-draft rule restrains trade

113

Id. at 485.
Id. at 484.
115
Id. at 485.
116
See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185–87 (3d Cir. 1998); McCormack v. NCAA, 845
F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1988). But see O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09–3329 CW, 2014 WL 3899815,
at *7, *37 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (evidencing the first federal case invalidating a NCAA amateur
eligibility rule, specifically a prohibition against student-athletes’ receiving a share of licensing and
broadcasting revenues from products incorporating their likenesses on a group basis, because it violates
antitrust law).
117
977 F.2d 1081, 1083–84, 1093–94 (7th Cir. 1992).
118
Id. at 1094.
119
Id. at 1090 (citation omitted).
114
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is absurd. None of the NCAA rules affecting college football
eligibility restrain trade in the market for college players because the NCAA does not exist as a minor league training
ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate education.120
However, Judge Flaum, who vigorously dissented in Banks, and other
Seventh Circuit judges121 expressed a willingness to characterize NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules as commercial restraints subject to antitrust scrutiny:
If the no-draft rule were scuttled, colleges that promised their
athletes the opportunity to test the waters in the NFL draft before their eligibility expired, and return if things didn’t work
out, would be more attractive to athletes than colleges that declined to offer the same opportunity. The no-draft rule eliminates this potential element of competition among colleges, the
purchasers of labor in the college football labor market. It categorically rules out a term of employment that players, the suppliers of labor in that market, would find advantageous.122
Nevertheless, even if they are deemed to be commercial in nature, the
Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its view that NCAA student-athlete eligibility rules are valid as a matter of law for purposes of antitrust law. In Agnew v.
NCAA,123 Judge Flaum, writing for a unanimous panel, stated:
A certain amount of collusion in college [sports] is permitted
because it is necessary for the product to exist. Accordingly,
when an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to help maintain the
120
121

Id. at 1089–90.
See e.g., United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993).
The NCAA depresses athletes’ income—restricting payments to the value of tuition, room,
and board, while receiving services of substantially greater worth. The NCAA treats this
as desirable preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced eye would see it as the use of
monopsony power to obtain athletes’ services for less than the competitive market price.

Id.
122
123

Banks, 977 F.2d at 1095 (citations omitted).
683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).

MITTEN FORMATTED FINAL

224

12/23/2014 1:39 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1

“revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” or the
“preservation of the student-athlete in higher education,” the
bylaw will be presumed procompetitive, since we must give the
NCAA “ample latitude to play that role.”124
Agnew distinguished NCAA limits on length of athletic scholarships and
caps on the number a college team may grant, which it characterized as commercial restraints that are not presumptively procompetitive, from student-athlete eligibility rules:
For the purposes of college sports, and in the name of amateurism, we consider players who receive nothing more than educational costs in return for their services to be “unpaid athletes.”
It is for this reason, though, that the prohibition against multiyear scholarships does not implicate the preservation of amateurism, for whether or not a player receives four years of educational expenses or one year of educational expenses, he is still
an amateur. It is not until payment above and beyond educational costs is received that a player is considered a “paid athlete.” . . . The NCAA's limitation on athlete compensation beyond educational expenses . . . directly advances the goal of
maintaining a “clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports,” . . . and thus is best categorized as an eligibility rule aimed at preserving the existence
of amateurism and the student-athlete.125
IV. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

The Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have decided
several important cases involving the professional sport industry, some
of which have established leading precedents; whereas, a few have been
reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Although it is difficult to
make broad generalizations because these cases consider several different
bodies of law, their respective professional sports law jurisprudence appears to be fairly conservative in that it is supportive of private sport governing body autonomy, as well as direct state regulation of professional

124
Id. at 342–43 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)
(the only Supreme Court case applying federal antitrust law to the NCAA)).
125
Id. at 344–45 (quoting Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089).
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sports and sports-specific state legislation. On the other hand, these
courts generally have demonstrated a reluctance to use general federal
statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)126
and the Sherman Act127 to regulate professional sports.
Because professional sports leagues and governing bodies are private associations, the Seventh Circuit has held they should be given substantial latitude
in governing their internal affairs, which justifies very deferential judicial review of their rules and decisions that are challenged by league clubs and individual members of the association. In Charles O. Finley v. Kuhn,128 the Seventh
Circuit upheld the authority of Major League Baseball (MLB) Commissioner
Bowie Kuhn to disapprove the sale of three Oakland Athletics player contracts
to the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees, which he found to be “‘not in
the best interests of baseball,’” primarily because these transactions harmed the
Oakland club and lessened competitive balance among MLB teams “through
the buying of success by the more affluent clubs,” such as the Red Sox and
Yankees.129 Finding the MLB clubs had given Commissioner Bowie Kuhn contractually broad authority to take action and make decisions, which in his sole
judgment, are consistent with the best interests of baseball, it concluded
“‘[w]hether he was right or wrong is beyond the competence and the jurisdiction
of this court to decide.’”130 Observing that the judiciary generally “‘will not
intervene in questions involving the enforcement of bylaws and matters of discipline in voluntary associations,”131 the court created two exceptions in which
judicial review and relief is appropriate: “[(]1) [W]here the rules, regulations or
judgments of the association are in contravention to the laws of the land or in
disregard of the charter or bylaws of the association and [(]2) where the association has failed to follow the basic rudiments of due process of law.”132
In Olinger v. United States Golf Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
claim of a professional golfer, whose degenerative medical condition significantly impaired his ability to walk, that the United States Golf Association’s
(USGA) refusal to allow him ride in a golf cart during the United States Open
golf tournament violates the ADA. 133 The official rules of golf do not prohibit

126

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12134 (2012).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
128
569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
129
Id. at 531–32.
130
Id. at 539–40.
131
Id. at 542 (quoting Am. Fed’n of Technical Eng’rs v. La Jeunesse, 347 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill.
1976)).
132
Id. at 544.
133
205 F.3d 1001, 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000).
127
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the use of golf carts and permit tournament competition organizers to determine
whether to permit their use, which the USGA declined to do.134 Although the
ADA requires that “reasonable modifications” be made to enable physically disabled athletes such as the plaintiff to participate in a sport, modifications that
would “fundamentally alter” the sport are not required.135 Determining “that
physical and mental fatigue and a uniform set of rules for all golfers are integral
parts of championship-level golf,”136 the court ruled that requiring the USGA to
allow plaintiff to use a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of the United
States Open golf tournament, which the ADA does not require.137 The panel
reasoned “the decision on whether the rules of the game should be adjusted to
accommodate [the plaintiff] is best left to those who hold the future of golf in
trust.”138
Charles O. Finley is a landmark case establishing the narrow scope of judicial review under the state common law of private associations,139 which has
been frequently cited and followed by courts in other jurisdictions.140 However,
Olinger subsequently was effectively overruled by PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.141
In Martin, the Supreme Court determined that, according to the rules of golf,
walking is not an essential part of even championship golf competitions, so the
use of carts would not necessarily constitute a fundamental alteration of the
game.142 It ruled that an individualized determination must be made by the
sport’s governing body to determine whether permitting a physically disabled
golfer would provide a competitive advantage, thereby fundamentally altering
a championship golf tournament.143
The Seventh Circuit and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have been similarly deferential regarding the authority of state administrative bodies to directly
regulate professional sports and state legislatures to enact statutes that benefit
professional sports organizations.

134

Id. at 1003.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
136
Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1006.
137
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
138
Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1007.
139
See generally Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
140
See generally Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397 (2nd Cir.
1998); Oakland Raiders v. NFL, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
141
532 U.S. 661 (2001).
142
Id. at 666 n.3, 685, 689 (citing U.S. Golf Ass’n, Rules and Decisions, USGA,
http://www.usga.org/Rule-Books/Rules-of-Golf/Appendix-I/ (Dec. 2, 2014).
143
Id. at 688.
135
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In Dimeo v. Griffin,144 a 7–4 en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit upheld
random, suspicionless testing of jockeys, harness racing drivers, and other participants in horse racing for recreational drugs.145 The majority rejected these
parties’ contention that the Illinois Racing Board’s drug testing policy violated
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.146 It concluded the Board has a substantial interest in protecting the safety
of these participants who may be injured or killed in accidents caused by illegal
drug use, as well as preventing potential lost state tax revenues if public interest
and betting in horse racing declined because jockeys and other participants were
using drugs and causing adverse perceptions of the fairness of races.147 Despite
“no proven cases of lethal or other serious accidents caused by drug-using horserace participants, or any other public scandals resulting from such use,”148 they
ruled that the Board’s interests outweighed “the incremental loss of privacy”149
imposed on the plaintiffs, who are participants in “a heavily regulated activity”150 that could be subjected to frequent medical exams to ensure their health
and safety.151
In Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State,152 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Stadium Act, a state statute permitting the
establishment of local baseball park districts in any county with a population in
excess of 500,000 and contiguous counties and authorizing them to build, finance, and operate professional baseball stadia.153 Only Milwaukee County,
where the Milwaukee Brewers played their games, and surrounding counties
were within the class created by this legislation.154 A key issue for purposes of
determining its constitutionality was “whether the legislation creating local
baseball park districts satisfies the public purpose doctrine,” not “whether the
game of baseball or the Milwaukee Brewers serve a public purpose.”155 The

144

943 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 680–81, 685.
146
Id. at 685.
147
Id. at 683.
148
Id. at 684.
149
Id. at 683.
150
Id. at 681.
151
Id. at 682. The dissenting judges noted “there is not the slightest evidence of drug-related accidents in this horse-racing case” and expressed “doubt that preventing the worst horse race accident in
history would justify setting aside the Constitution.” Id. at 688–89 (Wood, J., dissenting). They lamented, “It is too bad we cannot ask the horses about horse racing, but they are not talking.” Id. at 691.
152
546 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. 1996).
153
Id. at 428, 440.
154
Id. at 429.
155
Id. at 433.
145
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Wisconsin legislature’s purpose was “to promote the recreational opportunities
that flow from an economically viable professional baseball team and economic
development associated with baseball.”156 The court stated the legislature’s
opinion regarding “what constitutes a public purpose . . . must be given great
weight,”157 and its determination should be judicially overruled only if “‘manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.’”158 It followed the view adopted by a majority
of other jurisdictions and held “the fact that a private entity such as the Brewers
will benefit from the Stadium Act does not destroy [its] predominant public purpose.”159
Both the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have made significant contributions to the development of professional sports antitrust law
jurisprudence, one of the most important forms of public law regulation of the
professional sports industry.
In State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.,160 the Wisconsin Supreme Court broadly
construed the scope of professional baseball’s antitrust immunity to include
state antitrust law as well as federal antitrust law,161 which was subsequently
confirmed by Flood v. Kuhn.162 Despite concluding that the refusal of the National League and the failure of the American League to put a replacement team
in Milwaukee when the Braves moved to Atlanta is a concerted refusal to deal
in violation of Wisconsin antitrust law, the majority ruled that the United States
Constitution precluded its application.163 Some of its members concluded it
would violate the Supremacy Clause because “application and enforcement of
a state antitrust law to decisions of the league as to the location of franchises
and membership in the league would conflict with the national policy in this
segment of interstate commerce”164 based on United State Supreme Court precedent that professional baseball is immune from federal antitrust law.165 Others
determined that doing so would violate the Commerce Clause because “the
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Id. at 431.
Id. at 433–34 (citing State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Wis. 1969)).
158
Id. at 435 (quoting State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 205 N.W.2d 784, 798 (Wis.
1973)).
159
Id. at 434.
160
144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
161
Id. at 18.
162
407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972) (State antitrust regulation of baseball would conflict with federal
antitrust law immunity and burden interstate commerce, thereby violating the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses.).
163
Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 7, 18.
164
Id. at 17.
165
See Toolson v. N. Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc.
v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922).
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structure of the leagues, their decisions as to their own membership, location of
franchises, and things of that nature, require uniformity of regulation, and since
organized baseball operates widely in interstate commerce, the regulation, if
there is to be any, must be prescribed by Congress.”166
In United States Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago Downs Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit followed other federal appellate courts applying the rule of reason to challenged sports industry rules and internal regulation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain interstate
trade.167 It reversed the district court’s ruling that threats by the United States
Trotting Association (USTA), a horse racing record keeping and rule-making
organization, to impose sanctions on its members who raced horses at two tracks
that were receiving the benefits of its services without paying for them is a per
se illegal group boycott.168 The panel concluded that the more flexible rule of
reason, which balances the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the
challenged restraint on a case-by-case basis, generally should be applied.169 It
adopted the position of other circuit courts, recognizing that “in organized sports
‘interdependence,’ ‘cooperation,’ and at least ‘a few rules are essential to survival;’”170 therefore, sports industry restraints should not be presumed to be per
se illegal.171 The Seventh Circuit noted that preventing free-riding may be a
procompetitive justification necessary to cover the costs of effective internal
sports industry regulation.172
There are two noteworthy Seventh Circuit antitrust cases applying Section
1 to the rules and collective decisions of a major professional sports league that
allegedly restrain trade among its member clubs. An important threshold issue
is whether league clubs are separate economic entities whose collective action
is subject to Section 1, or whether a sports league and its members are an economically integrated single business enterprise whose conduct is not covered by
Section 1 (i.e., the “single entity defense”). Contrary to other circuit courts,173

166
Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 18 (citing Graves v. N.Y. ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479
n.1 (1939)). The dissenting judges “conclude[d] there is neither federal pre-emption of the Wisconsin
law nor is the remedy sought by the State of Wisconsin [(movement of the Braves back to Milwaukee
or placement of an expansion baseball club in Milwaukee)] of a nature that [it] will burden interstate
commerce.” Id. at 18–19 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
167
665 F.2d 781, 790 (7th Cir. 1981).
168
Id. at 783–85, 790–91.
169
Id. at 787–88, 790.
170
Id. at 789–90 (citation omitted).
171
Id. at 790.
172
Id. at 789.
173
Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL,
726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL,
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the Seventh Circuit adopted the latter view.
In Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. National Basketball Ass’n, the Seventh Circuit suggested the single entity defense should not be rejected simply
because American professional sports leagues are composed of independently
owned and operated member clubs that collectively govern their internal affairs.174 The court proposed that a functional approach, which analyzes whether
league clubs are economic competitors in the alleged relevant market that is
restrained, be used to determine the appropriateness of applying Section 1 on a
case-by-case basis.175 In other words, whether the particular challenged conduct
(in this case, an NBA rule limiting the number of superstation broadcasts of a
club’s games that may be nationally broadcast in a season) has the requisite
degree of economic integration to be considered that of a single economic entity
requires facet-by-facet analysis of each league’s operations.176
Judge Easterbrook observed that the NBA is closer to a single firm than a
group of independent firms when acting in the broadcast market:
Whether the NBA itself is more like a single firm, which would
be analyzed only under § 2 of the Sherman Act, [which prohibits monopolization or attempted monopolization,] or like a joint
venture, which would be subject to the Rule of Reason under §
1, is a tough question . . . . It has characteristics of both. Unlike
the colleges and universities that belong to the National Collegiate Athletic Association, . . . the NBA has no existence independent of sports. It makes professional basketball; only it can
make “NBA Basketball” games . . . . From the perspective of
fans and advertisers (who use sports telecasts to reach fans),
“NBA Basketball” is one product from a single source even
though the Chicago Bulls and Seattle Supersonics[, two of the
NBA’s clubs,] are highly distinguishable, just as General Motors is a single firm even though a Corvette differs from a Chevrolet. But from the perspective of college basketball players
who seek to sell their skills, the teams are distinct, and because
the human capital of players is not readily transferable to other
sports (as even Michael Jordan learned) the league looks more

670 F.2d 1249, 1257–58 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
174
95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996).
175
Id.
176
Id. at 596, 600.
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like a group of firms acting as a monopsony.177
Based on Chicago Professional Sports, in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League, the Seventh Circuit accepted the NFL’s argument that
its member clubs function as a single economic entity in jointly producing NFL
football and collectively licensing their trademarked merchandise, which does
not constitute concerted action under Section 1.178 The court held “the record
amply establishes that since 1963, the NFL teams have acted as one source of
economic power—under the auspices of NFL Properties—to license their intellectual property collectively and to promote NFL football.”179
Because this holding created a conflict among circuit courts regarding the
single entity defense, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. The Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling and concluded:
The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking [sic] quality or the single aggregation of economic power
characteristic of independent action. Each of the teams is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed
business. . . . The teams compete with one another, not only on
the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts, and for
contracts with managerial and playing personnel.
Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market
for intellectual property. To a firm making hats, the Saints and
the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable
trademarks. When each NFL team licenses its intellectual
property, it is not pursuing the “common interests of the whole”
league but is instead pursuing interests of each “corporation itself;”. . . teams are acting as “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,” and each team therefore is a
potential “independent cente[r] of decisionmaking [sic].”. . .
Decisions by NFL teams to license their separately owned
trademarks collectively and to only one vendor are decisions
that “depriv[e] the marketplace of independent centers of deci-

177

Id. at 599.
Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 2008).
179
Id.
178
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sionmaking [sic],” . . . and therefore of actual or potential competition.180
Nevertheless, Chicago Professional Sports established precedent holding
that league restrictions on the licensing or sale of a member club’s intellectual
property rights must be evaluated under a full rule of reason analysis, which has
been followed by other circuit courts.181 The Seventh Circuit held that proof the
NBA has market power is required to prove the NBA’s limit on the number of
games a club may televise on a superstation and its tax on televised superstation
games restrains trade.182 As the court explained, the plaintiff must prove there
are no reasonable entertainment substitutes for NBA games from the perspective of television viewers (or no alternative means for companies to advertise
their products to consumers with the same demographic characteristics):
[T]here is no time slot when NBA basketball predominates.
The NBA’s season lasts from November through June; games
are played seven days a week. This season overlaps all of the
other professional and college sports, so even sports fanatics
have many other options. From advertisers’ perspective—
likely the right one, because advertisers are the ones who actually pay for telecasts—the market is even more competitive.
Advertisers seek viewers of certain demographic characteristics, and homogeneity is highly valued. . . . If the NBA assembled for advertisers an audience that was uniquely homogeneous, or had especially high willingness-to-buy, then it might
have market power even if it represented a small portion of airtime.183
The Seventh Circuit also decided two Sherman Act Section 2 cases against
the owner/operator of a sports stadium contending that their policies constitute
illegal monopolization or attempted monopolization of a local market. These
rulings are significant because relatively few cases have addressed this issue in

180

Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 196–97 (2010) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984)).
181
See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 334 (2d Cir. 2008); Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. NHL, 270 Fed. Appx. 56, 58 (2d. Cir. 2008).
182
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600–01 (7th Cir. 1996).
183
Id.
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the context of professional sports. In Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,184 the court
ruled that the owner of the Chicago Stadium, the largest indoor sports arena in
Chicago at the time, violated Section 2 by using its “‘strategic dominance’ of
the market in suitable arenas” to prevent another bidder from competing to purchase the Chicago Bulls NBA club.185 It affirmed the lower court’s finding that
“the relevant market was competition for the presentation of live professional
basketball in Chicago,”186 while rejecting defendants’ assertion “that the parties
must be in head-to-head competition in the relevant market . . . before the antitrust laws will apply.”187 In Elliott v. United Center, the Seventh Circuit held
that “‘[f]ood sales within the United Center’” (the current home of the Chicago
Blackhawks and Bulls teams) is not a relevant market. 188 The court rejected the
Section 2 claim of vendors who sold peanuts outside the United Center that the
arena’s policy prohibiting patrons from bringing food into the arena is “an illegal attempt to monopolize food sales inside the arena and in the surrounding
geographic area.”189 Consistent with Chicago Professional Sports, it “rejected
the proposition that a firm can be said to have monopoly power in its own product, absent proof that the product itself has no economic substitutes.”190
In addition to developing a substantial body of law governing the relationship between a professional sports league or organization and its members, the
Seventh Circuit authored a leading case defining the legal duty of care an agent
is required to satisfy when representing professional athletes. In Zinn v. Parrish,191 the Seventh Circuit ruled that an agent is obligated to use “‘reasonable
efforts’”192 in obtaining employment for his client as a professional athlete and
reasonable care in negotiating employment contracts.193 Regarding related services such as seeking endorsement contracts and off-season employment for the
player, the court held that an agent has an implied duty “to make ‘good faith’
efforts to obtain what [the player] sought” and “such efforts constitute full performance of [his] obligations.”194 Absent any guarantees or promises, an agent

184

807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 527, 530, 562.
186
Id. at 530, 562.
187
Id. at 531.
188
126 F.3d 1003, 1003 (7th Cir. 1997).
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1005.
191
644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981).
192
Id. at 365.
193
Id. at 366.
194
Id.
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who has “at all times acted in good faith, with a willingness ‘to provide assistance within his ability,’”195 is not liable for unsuccessful results.
V. OLYMPIC SPORTS
The Seventh Circuit’s Olympic sports jurisprudence is more developed
than any other federal appellate court and is the source of several significant
precedents establishing the generally accepted legal principle that American
courts have a very limited role in regulating Olympic sports, particularly athlete
eligibility disputes.
In Michels v. United States Olympic Committee,196 the Seventh Circuit
held that the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (ASA)197 does not provide an athlete
with an express or implied private right of action to have an athletic eligibility
or participation dispute resolved by a federal court.198 The International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), the international governing body for the sport of
weightlifting, suspended an American weightlifter for two years because he
tested positive for testosterone, a banned substance, during the Pan American
Games.199 Because of his suspension, the United States Wrestling Federation
(USWF), the national governing body (NGB) for the sport of weightlifting in
the U.S., refused to permit him to compete for a spot on the American weightlifting team that would compete at the 1984 Olympic Games.200 The athlete’s
claim that his test results were invalid was rejected by both the IWF and the
United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in separate internal administrative
proceedings, and his suspension was upheld.201 Thereafter, the athlete asserted
the USOC violated the ASA.202
The court concluded the ASA’s legislative history “clearly reveals that
Congress intended not to create a private cause of action under the Act” for
athletes.203 Although the originally proposed version of the ASA contained an
“Amateur Athlete’s Bill of Rights,” it was eliminated after “‘strong resistance

195

Id.
741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984).
197
36 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). In 1998, Congress revised the ASA, which was re-named the Ted
Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. See 36 U.S.C. § 220501 (2013).
198
Michels, 741 F.2d at 156. The ASA now explicitly states, “[N]either this paragraph nor any other
provision of this chapter shall create a private right of action under this chapter.” 36 U.S.C §
220505(b)(9).
199
Michels, 741 F.2d at 156.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 156–57.
202
Id. at 156.
203
Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
196

MITTEN FINAL FORMATTED

2014]

12/23/2014 1:39 PM

SEVENTH CIRCUI T AND WISCONSIN

235

by the high school and college communities.’”204 The legislative history indicated “‘the compromise reached was that certain substantive provisions on athletes’ rights would be included in the USOC Constitution, and not in the
bill.’”205 Thus, the court dismissed the athlete’s claims under the ASA.206
Concurring, Judge Posner stated that the USOC’s Constitution should
not be characterized as a federal law, the violation of which would create a federal cause of action for athletes.207 Doing so would contravene the compromise
created by the ASA, which requires the USOC to establish procedures for resolving a dispute between an NGB and an athlete relating to his or her opportunity to participate in the Olympic Games.208 He explained: “Any doubt on
this score can be dispelled by the reflection that there can be few less suitable
bodies than the federal courts for determining the eligibility, or the procedures
for determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic
Games.”209 He noted the athlete’s dispute ultimately is with the IWF, an international body that is not a member of the USOC, rather than the USWF.210
Judge Posner observed:
It is not by accident that the statute does not require the [USOC]
to establish machinery for resolving disputes between athletes
and nonmembers. . . . The USOC has no control over nonmembers. The [IWF] can thumb its collective nose at the [USOC].
It can do more: if the USOC tried to put Michels on the U.S.
Olympic Weightlifting team in defiance of the IWF’s expulsion, the IWF could ask the International Olympic Committee
to disqualify the team. Michels might succeed only in destroying the Olympic hopes of all the American weightlifters.211

204

Id. at 158.
Id. (citation omitted).
206
Id.
207
Id. at 159 (Posner, J., concurring). In S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U. S. Olympic Comm., the
Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the USOC is a private entity, thereby implicitly validating Judge
Posner’s conclusion that the USOC Constitution is not federal law. See 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
208
Michels, 741 F.2d at 159 (Posner, J., concurring).
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
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In Lindland v. United States Wrestling Ass’n,212 the Seventh Circuit recognized that the ASA provides an Olympic sport athlete with the right to submit
an eligibility dispute with an NGB to final and binding arbitration in accordance
with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) if
it is not resolved by the USOC to his or her satisfaction.213 It confirmed an
arbitration award (Burns award) finding that the USA Wrestling Association’s
grievance procedures for protesting the results of a match to determine a spot
on the U.S. Olympic team were flawed and ordering a rematch as a remedy. 214
The court confirmed the Burns award because (1) the arbitrator had valid jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the athlete challenging those procedures
and USA Wrestling; and (2) there was no evidence it was the product of any
corruption, fraud, or bias, which would have been valid grounds for vacating
the award.215 Thus, the wrestler who won the rematch, Matt Lindland, was entitled to be USA Wrestling’s nominee for the 2000 Olympic team in his weight
class.216
The Seventh Circuit vacated a subsequent arbitration award (Campbell
award) brought by the wrestler who lost the rematch, Keith Sieracki, which directed USA Wrestling not to implement the Burns award based on the arbitrator’s determination that the result of the original match was valid and its grievance procedures were adequate.217 The court concluded the ASA “does not
authorize arbitration about the propriety of another arbitrator’s decision”218 because the ASA “would be self-destructive if it authorized such proceedings,
which would lead to enduring turmoil (as happened here) and defeat the statute’s function of facilitating final resolution of disputes.”219 It also noted that

212

227 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1003–04 (referencing ASA § 220529(a)).
214
Id. at 1008.
215
Id. at 1001–02. See also U. S. Wrestling Fed’n v. Wrestling Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313,
320 (7th Cir. 1979) (confirming an AAA arbitration award resolving a dispute concerning which of two
organizations is entitled to be designated as the NGB for wrestling because alleged interest or bias of
arbitration panel’s chair is “too ‘remote, uncertain, and speculative’ to require the arbitration decision
to be set aside”).
216
Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1005.
217
Id. at 1003. Sieracki was not a party to the Burns arbitration proceeding because the then-current
provisions of the ASA only provided for arbitration between an aggrieved athlete and an NGB, rather
than arbitration among the athletes. After Lindland, the USOC’s Bylaws were amended to provide that
appropriate notice be given to all athletes who may be adversely affected by the arbitration. These
athletes may choose to participate in the arbitration as a party. An athlete who receives notice is bound
by the arbitration decision even if he or she chooses not to participate in the arbitration proceeding.
United States Olympic Committee Bylaw 9.8 (2013).
218
Lindland, 227 F.3d at 1003.
219
Id. at 1004.
213
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AAA’s Commercial Rules provide that “an ‘arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine [sic] the merits of any claim already decided.’”220 Regarding “athletic justice,” the court ruled that an Olympic sports arbitrator is not permitted
to disregard applicable rules: “Arbitrators are not ombudsmen; they are authorized to resolve disputes under contracts and rules, not to declare how the world
should work in the large.”221 If this occurs, the resulting award will be judicially
vacated rather than confirmed and given enforceable legal effect.222
Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic Federation,223 another leading
precedent established by the Seventh Circuit, illustrates that U.S. courts will not
resolve the merits of athlete eligibility or participation disputes with either national (e.g., USOC, NGBs) and international sports governing bodies (e.g., International Olympic Committee (IOC)), or international federations (IFs).224 In
this case, accomplished middle-distance runner Mary Decker Slaney sought to
judicially challenge an International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) Arbitral Tribunal’s (Tribunal) determination that urine test results, revealing she had
a T/E ratio greater than six to one, constituted a positive test for testosterone in
violation of the IAAF’s anti-doping rules and justify suspending her from competition in IAAF-sanctioned events.225 She asserted several state contract and
tort law claims against the USOC and IAAF.226
The Seventh Circuit ruled the ASA preempts Slaney’s state law claims
against the USOC, which did not assert it was violating its own eligibility rules,
because “eligibility decisions fall within the USOC’s exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters pertaining to United States participation in the Olympic Games.”227
It concluded “the method by which the USOC determines the eligibility of [its]
athletes” is not subject to judicial review.228 According to the court, the need
for uniformity in determining questions of Olympic athlete eligibility and avoiding potentially conflicting judicial interpretations by different courts justified

220
Id. (quoting AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION: ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION
PROCEDURES, Rule 48(a) (Oct. 1, 2009)).
221
Id.
222
Id. at 1003 (citing Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
223
244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
224
Id. at 601.
225
Id. at 585–87.
226
Id. Slaney also asserted a Racketeer Influended and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against
the USOC, which was rejected because her complaint did not plead all of the necessary elements of this
federal statutory claim. Id. at 596–01.
227
Id. at 595–96.
228
Id. at 596.
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this conclusion.229
The court held that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention),230 an international treaty
to which the U.S. is a party, precluded Slaney from re-litigating the same issues
decided by the Tribunal, a foreign arbitration proceeding in Monaco (which also
is a party to the New York Convention).231 The Tribunal found Slaney committed a doping violation because she did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that her elevated T/E ratio was caused by a pathological or physiological
condition.232 Because her state law claims would require judicial determination
of whether she “was properly found guilty of a doping offense,” the Seventh
Circuit concluded that reconsidering these claims “would undermine or nullify
the Tribunal’s decision” in violation of the New York Convention.233 It explained: “Our judicial system is not meant to provide a second bite at the apple
for those who have sought adjudication of their disputes in other forums and are
not content with the resolution they have received.”234 The court rejected her
contention that the Tribunal’s arbitration award is unenforceable because she
had been denied the fair opportunity to present her case and the award itself
violated U.S. public policy.235 It found she had received a fundamentally fair
hearing and required Slaney to prove her elevated T/E ratio was caused by a
pathological or physiological condition did not violate the “exceedingly narrow” public policy defense recognized by U.S. courts.236
VI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES
In general, the Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin courts have broadly defined the scope of the intellectual property rights of sports clubs, leagues, and
organizations as well as athletes.237
229

Id. at 595 (citing Dolan v. U.S. Equestrian Team, Inc., 608 A.2d 434, 437 (N.J. App. Div. 1992);
Walton-Floyd v. USOC, 965 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998)).
230
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
231
Slaney, 244 F.3d at 588, 594.
232
Id. at 589.
233
Id. at 590.
234
Id. at 591.
235
Id. at 591, 593–94.
236
Id. at 593–94.
237
See infra notes 235–74 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that a Wisconsin federal
magistrate judge concluded that Amerik Wojciechowski is the “likely author” (i.e., creator) of the famous “cheese wedge hat” worn with pride by thousands of fans of Wisconsin professional sports teams,
particularly the Green Bay Packers. Foamation, Inc. v. Wedeward Enters. Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1287,
1297 (E.D. Wis. 1996). Observing that no one may have a valid copyright in the cheese wedge hat
because it was commercially produced and distributed without the required affixed notice of copyright,
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The Seventh Circuit and its federal district courts generally have provided
a significant degree of legal protection to sports teams’ trademarks under the
Lanham Act, a federal statute prohibiting the unauthorized use of another’s
trademark that creates a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace.238 Boston
Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc.239 is part of a group
of mid-1970s cases that “recognizes a trademark as a product and confers broad
property rights on its owner beyond the right to prevent likely consumer confusion regarding the origin or source of merchandise bearing the trademark.” 240
In this 1973 case, a Wisconsin federal district court ruled that defendant’s unauthorized sale of hats with emblems bearing the Boston Bruins NHL team’s
BRUINS and circled “B” marks, which are federally registered for its professional ice hockey games, violates the Lanham Act.241 It found that defendant’s
conduct “was likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” 242
despite no evidence of “misrepresenting its caps as caps manufactured by plaintiff or licensees of plaintiff’s . . . marks” or any consumer confusion regarding
the source of its goods.243
The Seventh Circuit has held that a professional sports club has the exclusive right to use its team name even after relocating to another city and to
prevent unauthorized usage that creates a likelihood of consumer confusion. In
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club Ltd.,244 the
court enjoined a Canadian Football League team from calling itself the “‘Baltimore CFL Colts’” because this name was shown to create a likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the team’s nonexistent relationship with the “‘Indianapolis Colts,’” an NFL team that left Baltimore and moved to Indianapolis
nine years ago.245 It explained:
If “Baltimore CFL Colts” is confusingly similar to “Indianapolis Colts” by virtue of the history of the Indianapolis team and
the court noted that “the public interest is generally best served by robust competition . . . in the cheese
wedge hat market” and that the public benefits “from an abundant quantity, and ever improving quality,
of cheese wedge hats.” Id. at 1298.
238
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(3)(D) (2006).
239
178 U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
240
Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap to American Needle and Beyond: Antitrust Law’s Limited
Capacity to Stitch Consumer Harm from Professional Sports Club Trademark Monopolies, 86 TUL. L.
REV. 901, 908 (2012).
241
Bos. Prof’l, 178 U.S.P.Q., at 276–78.
242
Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
243
Id. at 277.
244
34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994).
245
Id. at 411, 416.
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the overlapping product and geographical markets served by it
and by the new Baltimore team, the latter’s use of the abandoned mark would infringe the Indianapolis Colts’ new mark.
The Colts’ abandonment of a mark confusingly similar to their
new mark neither broke the continuity of the team in its different locations—it was the same team, merely having a different
home base and therefore a different geographical component in
its name—nor entitled a third party to pick it up and use it to
confuse Colts fans, and other actual or potential consumers of
products and services marketed by the Colts or by other National Football League teams, with regard to the identity, sponsorship, or league affiliation of the third party, that is, the new
Baltimore team.246
Similarly, in Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co.,247
the Seventh Circuit ruled that plaintiff’s proposed use of the “St. Louis Rams”
as the name of a fictional, cartoon sports team would infringe the Los Angeles
Rams NFL club’s right to continue using “Rams” to identify the team after its
upcoming relocation to St. Louis.248 Observing that the club was founded as the
Cleveland Rams in 1937, moved to become the Los Angeles Rams in 1946, and
was relocating to become the St. Louis Rams in 1995, the court determined:
“[T]he Rams organization and the NFL had a long-established priority over the
use of the ‘Rams’ name in connection with the same professional football team,
regardless of urban affiliation.”249
In contrast, in Illinois High School Ass’n v. GTE Vantage, Inc.,250 the
Seventh Circuit narrowly construed the Illinois High School Association’s
(IHSA) trademark rights in “March Madness,” which it had been using since
the early 1940s to identify its high school basketball tournament.251 It held that
the IHSA could not prevent the NCAA from using “March Madness” as the
name of its college basketball tournament or licensing third parties to use this
term for commercial purposes.252 In 1982, broadcaster Brent Musburger used
“March Madness” to refer to the NCAA’s basketball tournament, which became

246

Id. at 413.
188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999).
248
Id. at 430, 435, 437–39.
249
Id. at 431, 435.
250
99 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 1996).
251
Id. at 245, 247.
252
Id. at 248.
247
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widely used by the national media and public.253 Because “‘March Madness’”
is a name “the public has affixed to something other than, as well as, the Illinois
high school basketball tournament;” the court characterized it as a dual-use term
and “that for the sake of protecting effective communication,” and that the
“IHSA’s rights do not extend to the NCAA tournament and to merchandise such
as Vantage’s game that is sold in connection with that tournament.”254
Consistent with the broad scope of protection generally provided to
sports trademarks, the Seventh Circuit also has broadly construed the copyright
and contractual rights of producers of sporting events. In Baltimore Orioles,
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,255 the Seventh Circuit held that
Major League Baseball (MLB) clubs own the copyright to televised baseball
games, which confers exclusive rights to the televised performances of the players.256 Unlike the underlying games, the telecasts of the games are copyrighted
original and creative audiovisual works within the subject matter of copyright257
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression because they are simultaneously videotaped when broadcast. The court determined:
Because the Players are employees and their performances before broadcast audiences are within the scope of their employment, the telecasts of major league baseball games, which consist of the Players’ performances, are works made for hire
[under the Copyright Act]. . . . Thus, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Clubs are presumed to own all of the
rights encompassed in the telecasts of the games. The district
court found that there was no written agreement that the Clubs
would not own the copyright to the telecasts, and, therefore,
that the copyright was owned by the Clubs.258

253

Id. at 245.
Id. at 247–48.
255
805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
256
Id. at 673, 677. The court expressed no opinion regarding whether the copyrights in game telecasts “are owned separately by individual clubs or jointly by some combination of clubs,” or whether
the copyrights “are owned exclusively by the Clubs or jointly by the Clubs and the television stations
or networks that record and broadcast the games.” Id. at 673–74 n.18.
257
The court determined that “telecasts are independent creations,” “filming an event involves creative labor,” and “telecasts are audiovisual works” under § 102(a)(6) of the Copyright Act. Id. at 668–
69.
258
Id. at 670. The court noted:
254

Contrary to the Players’ contention, the effect of this decision is not to grant the Clubs perpetual rights to the Players’ performances. The Players remain free to attain their objective
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The Seventh Circuit rejected the MLB players union’s claim that the clubs’
unauthorized telecasts of games in which they played violated their publicity
rights.259 Because the clubs owned the copyright to televised baseball games, it
ruled that the players’ publicity rights in their game performances were
preempted by the Copyright Act.260 The court explained:
[O]nce a performance is reduced to tangible form, there is no
distinction between the performance and the recording of the
performance for the purpose of preemption under § 301(a).
Thus, if a baseball game were not broadcast or were telecast
without being recorded, the Players’ performances similarly
would not be fixed in tangible form and their rights of publicity
would not be subject to preemption. . . . By virtue of being
videotaped, however, the Players’ performances are fixed in
tangible form, and any rights of publicity in their performances
that are equivalent to the rights contained in the copyright of
the telecast are preempted.261
In Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co.,262 the Seventh
Circuit held that the WIAA, which the parties stipulated is a state actor subject
to the Federal Constitution, has a property right in its tournament games and its
grant of exclusive contract rights to stream games over the Internet does not
violate the First Amendment.263 Finding that “tournament games are a performance product of WIAA that it has the right to control,”264 the court determined
that the “WIAA has the right to package and distribute its performance; nothing
in the First Amendment confers on the media an affirmative right to broadcast
entire performances”265 without its authorization. Observing that the WIAA’s
media policy permits the media “to talk and write about the events to their

by bargaining with the Clubs for a contractual declaration that the Players own a joint or an
exclusive interest in the copyright of the telecasts.

Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
259
Id. at 674–75.
260
Id.
261
Id. at 675 (citation omitted).
262
658 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2011).
263
Id. at 616, 629.
264
Id. at 616.
265
Id. at 622.
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hearts’ content,” it ruled, “What they cannot do is to appropriate the entertainment product that WIAA has created without paying for it.”266
Like many other states,267 Wisconsin recognizes a common law and statutory268 right of publicity, which provides athletes with the exclusive right to
commercially exploit and license others to use their respective names, likenesses, and other aspects of their persona in connection with the advertising and
sale of products and services.269 In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,270 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court created a common law right in the “publicity value”
of one’s name and identity because of the public interest in permitting control
of “commercial uses of one’s personality and the prevention of unjust enrichment of those who appropriate the publicity value of another’s identity.”271 The
court ruled that Elroy Hirsch, a nationally prominent former collegiate and professional athlete widely known as “Crazylegs” because of his unique style of
running, had a valid damages claim for the unauthorized use of “Crazylegs’’ to
market a shaving gel for women.272
In Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.,273 the Seventh Circuit held that a Chicago grocery store chain’s advertisement in Sports Illustrated magazine’s commemorative issue congratulating former Chicago Bulls player Michael Jordan
on his recent induction into the basketball hall of fame is commercial speech
subject to his alleged right of publicity and Lanham Act unfair competition
claims.274 Concluding that the “ad ha[d] an unmistakable commercial function:
enhancing the Jewel-Osco brand in the minds of consumers,”275 it reversed the
lower court’s ruling that the ad is noncommercial speech protected by the First
Amendment.276 Even though it did not market any specific products to consumers, the court characterized this ad as “a form of image advertising aimed at
promoting goodwill for the Jewel-Osco brand by exploiting public affection for

266

Id.
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 1 §§ 6:1–6:9 (West
Group ed., 2d ed. 2012).
268
WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (2011–12).
269
§ 995.50 (2)(b) (2011–12).
270
280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
271
Id. at 134 (citation omitted).
272
Id. at 131, 137. The court also held that the facts established a prima facie case of common law
trade name infringement based on evidence that defendant’s unauthorized use of “Crazylegs” creates a
likelihood of public confusion regarding Hirsch’s sponsorship of its shaving gel. Id. at 139–40.
273
743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014).
274
Id. at 511, 519–20, 522.
275
Id. at 518.
276
Id. at 512, 522.
267
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Jordan at an auspicious moment in his career.”277
VII. TORTS ISSUES
Most of Wisconsin’s sports law jurisprudence involves tort law issues, particularly liability for personal injuries to co-participants or spectators during
sports events, which requires judicial interpretation and application of Wisconsin statutes regarding these issues. Wisconsin courts also have decided several
cases regarding the validity of liability waivers for personal injuries suffered
during recreational sports as well as one of the few U.S. cases concerning the
legal duty of a state high school athletic association to protect athletes’ health
and safety. Sports-related tort issues are generally governed by state law, and
there are no Seventh Circuit cases considering these issues.
In Wisconsin, the general common law negligence rule is that a person has
a legal duty to use reasonable care and is subject to liability for breaching this
duty.278 In Mohr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,279 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals rejected the WIAA’s assertion that it had no legal duty to independently determine whether the National Federation of High Schools’ Rule
2–7–2, which permitted (but did not require) the use of starting platforms for
high school interscholastic swimming events for pools with water depths of 3.5
feet, established an appropriate level of safety.280 A high school swimmer, who
was injured when he struck his head during a practice dive off an eighteen-inch
platform at his school’s pool, alleged the WIAA negligently adopted this rule,
thereby requiring its member schools to follow the rule and creating the belief
it was safe to use platforms with 3.5 feet of water.281 Reversing the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment for the WIAA, the appellate court ruled, “[T]he
crucial question with regard to the WIAA’s duty is not . . . whether it had a duty
to make its own assessment of the adequacy of Rule 2–7–2 before adopting it,
but, rather, whether its conduct in not doing so was consistent with its duty to
exercise reasonable care.”282
Regarding the liability of a co-participant for injuring another during a

277

Id. at 519.
See, e.g., Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55 ¶ 25, 262 Wis.2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350, 356 (2003)
(Cause in fact, damages, and consideration of public policy factors are other elements of a negligence
claim.).
279
2004 WI App 5, 269 Wis.2d 302, 674 N.W.2d 576.
280
Id. at ¶¶ 4, 38, 40, 45.
281
Id. at ¶¶ 3, 6.
282
Id. at ¶ 41.
278
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sporting event, in Lestina v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co.,283 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court adopted a negligence standard, which is consistent with its general torts jurisprudence but contrary to the majority of other jurisdictions that
permit recovery only for intentional or reckless conduct.284 It affirmed a jury
verdict finding defendant negligently injured plaintiff during an adult recreational soccer league game by “slide tackling” him in violation of the league’s
rules.285 Acknowledging that few cases allow recovery merely for proof of negligence because of concern that liability would discourage participation in
sports, the court nevertheless concluded “the negligence standard, properly understood and applied, is suitable for cases involving recreational team contact
sports” and is “sufficiently flexible” to enable vigorous athletic competition.286
It identified several factors relevant in determining whether a player’s conduct
is negligent:
[T]he sport involved; the rules and regulations governing the
sport; the generally accepted customs and practices of the sport
(including the types of contact and the level of violence generally accepted); the risks inherent in the game and those that are
outside the realm of anticipation; the presence of protective
equipment or uniforms; and the facts and circumstances of the
particular case, including the ages and physical attributes of the
participants, the participants’ respective skills at the game, and
the participants’ knowledge of the rules and customs.287
In response to Lestina, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the following statute:
A participant in a recreational activity that includes physical
contact between persons in a sport involving amateur teams,
including teams in recreational, municipal, high school and college leagues, may be liable for an injury inflicted on another
participant during and as part of that sport in a tort action only
if the participant who caused the injury acted recklessly or with

283

501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993).
See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 884 (3d ed. 2013).
285
Lestina, 501 N.W.2d at 29, 33.
286
Id. at 33.
287
Id. (citation omitted).
284
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intent to cause injury.288
Wisconsin courts have broadly construed this statute, particularly the terms
“sport,” “physical contact,” and “amateur teams,” while demonstrating a reluctance to find that conduct injuring a co-participant is actionable. In Noffke v.
Bakke,289 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that high school cheerleading is a
sport for purposes of the statute because it is “‘[a]n activity involving physical
exertion and skill that is governed by a set of rules or customs,’” which involves
physical contact because “cheerleaders touch one another.”290 Therefore, a fellow cheerleader was immune from negligence liability for allegedly failing to
properly spot the plaintiff who fell while practicing a cheerleading stunt before
a basketball game.291 It rejected plaintiff’s argument that the statute applies only
to “competitive team sports,” specifically “‘aggressive’ [contact] sports such as
football, hockey, or boxing.” because its language does not have either limitation.292 The court concluded defendant was not reckless, which requires “conscious disregard of an unreasonable and substantial risk of serious bodily harm
to another,” as a matter of law because his conduct was merely inadvertent, unskilled, or unreasonable, which does not satisfy this standard.293
The Wisconsin Courts of Appeals has applied Noffke’s definition of a
“sport” broadly and extended the statutory scope of co-participant immunity
from negligence liability to encompass injuries occurring during unorganized
pick-up games294 and recreational activities such as paintball.295

288
WIS. STAT. § 895.525(4m)(a) (2011–2012). The same liability standard applies to injuries occurring during athletic competition between “professional teams in a professional league.” §
895.525(4m)(b).
289
2009 WI 10, 315 Wis.2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156.
290
Id. at ¶¶ 17, 18 (quoting AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1742 (3d ed.
1992)).
291
Id. at ¶ 23.
292
Id. at ¶¶ 27, 30. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Abrahamson, while acknowledging dictionary definitions “plainly suggest that team sports involve competition . . . [and] the cheerleading
squad . . . did not participate in any organized cheerleading competitions,” explained she agreed with
the result, which is consistent with “the legislature’s express purpose of ‘decreas[ing] uncertainty regarding the legal responsibility for deaths or injuries that result from participation in recreational activities and thereby to help assure the continued availability in this state of enterprises that offer recreational activities to the public.” Id. at ¶¶ 61–62, 65, 67 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
293
Id. at ¶¶ 35–37 (quoting Werdehoff v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 600 N.W.2d 214, 222 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999) (citing Kellar v. Lloyd, 509 N.W.2d 87, 95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
294
See, e.g., Kleeman v. Emerson, 2011 WI App 1 ¶ 5, 330 Wis.2d 836, 794 N.W.2d 928 (ice
hockey).
295
See, e.g., Houston v. Freese, 2012 WI App 97 ¶ 19, 344 Wis.2d 125, 820 N.W.2d 157.
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Courts have uniformly rejected personal injury claims by sports event spectators under Wisconsin’s “safe-place statute,” which codifies the common law
negligence standard, by requiring a public building such as a sports facility to
be “safe,” meaning it provides “such freedom from danger to the life, health,
safety or welfare of . . . frequenters, or the public . . . as the nature of the . . .
public building, will reasonably permit.”296 Although non-contractual assumption of the risk is not an affirmative defense to claimed violation of the safeplace statute, Wisconsin courts effectively hold that spectators assume the inherent risks of injury from flying projectiles such as balls and hockey pucks
going into the seating area of an arena or stadium during sports events pursuant
to a contributory negligence analysis.297 In accordance with this rationale,
courts generally have ruled that the organizer or producer of a sporting event
and the operator or owner of the facility in which it is held are not liable for
spectator injuries as a matter of law if customary structural safety precautions
are provided.
In Powless v. Milwaukee County,298 the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that defendants Milwaukee County and the National League Baseball
Club of Milwaukee were not liable for injury to a spectator who was struck by
a foul ball while attending a Milwaukee Braves game at Milwaukee County
Stadium.299 It explained that the stadium owner and club are not insurers of the
safety of spectators, who know that foul balls frequently enter unscreened areas
of the stands.300 Finding the position and size of the stadium’s backstop complied with “standards and customs of all major league baseball parks”301 and
spectators’ interest in obtaining a foul ball as a souvenir is “an integral part of
the excitement and enjoyment of attending a baseball game,” it noted the trial
court’s conclusion that requiring defendants “to screen the entire ball park for
the adequate protection of all persons in the stands would be unreasonable.”302
In this case, the plaintiff chose not to purchase a seat behind the screen and was
sitting 234 feet from home plate marking her scorecard when she was hit by the
foul ball.303 The Supreme Court ruled “that the evidence of [her] contributory

296

WIS. STAT. § 101.01(13) (2011–12).
Under the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, the plaintiff is barred from recovery of any
damages if his contributory negligence is “greater than the negligence of the person against whom
recovery is sought.” WIS. STAT. § 895.045(1) (2011–12).
298
94 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1959).
299
Id. at 188, 191.
300
Id. at 189.
301
Id.
302
Id. at 190.
303
Id. at 188.
297
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negligence is so strong that it is unnecessary to decide whether” defendants violated the safe-place statute.304
Following Powless, in Moulas v. PBC Productions, Inc.,305 the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals denied recovery to a spectator who was hit by a hockey puck
while attending a Milwaukee Admirals game at the Bradley Center, whose sideboards and Plexiglas complied with league rules.306 Affirming the grant of summary judgment for defendants, the court explained, “[T]he fact that the accident
occurred does not establish fault.”307 Because plaintiff had attended more than
ten previous hockey games and seen pucks flying into the stands, it concluded:
Because the risks associated with hockey should be known to
the reasonable person attending a game, . . . [plaintiff] was
aware of the risks, . . . and because she chose to attend despite
her knowledge and the warnings espoused, we conclude that
summary judgment was appropriate. [Plaintiff’s] contributory
negligence—as a matter of law—was at least 1% more than any
of the defendants.308
Although a contractual waiver of liability or exculpatory clause for personal injury suffered by a sports participant or spectator is not “invalid per se”309
under Wisconsin law, such contracts “are not favored by the law because they
tend to allow conduct below the acceptable standard of care” and will be construed “strictly against the party seeking to rely on them.”310 In Yauger v. Skiing

304

Id. at 191.
570 N.W.2d 739 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
306
Id. at 740–41, 745.
307
Id. at 743.
308
Id. at 745. See generally also Shain v. Racine Raiders Football Club, 2006 WI App 257, 297
Wis. 2d 869, 726 N.W.2d 869 (upholding summary judgment for defendants on safe-place statute claim
by a youth football coach injured while his team was providing half-time entertainment during a minor
league professional football game); Heenan v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2000 WI App 143,237 Wis. 2d
695, 616 N.W.2d 923 (affirming summary judgment against spectator hit by a hockey puck during
game at Bradley Center based on Moulas).
309
Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Ctr., 2005 WI 4 ¶ 12, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 311–12, 691 N.W.2d
334, 338. See also Eder v. Lake Geneva Raceway, 523 N.W.2d 429, 433 n.4 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994)
(invalidating spectator personal injury waiver because defendant’s alleged negligence not contemplated
by parties at time it was executed, but declining to “make the general statement that exculpatory contracts involving spectators are void as against public policy”).
310
Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Wis. 1996) (citing Richards v. Richards, 513
N.W.2d 118, 121 (Wis. 1994)).
305
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Enterprises, Inc.,311 the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that “public policy is
the germane analysis”312 and two requirements must be satisfied for a liability
waiver to be enforced: “First, the waiver must clearly, unambiguously, and unmistakably inform the signer of what is being waived. Second, the form, looked
at in its entirety, must alert the signer to the nature and significance of what is
being signed.”313
Yauger held that the following waiver does not satisfy either requirement:
In support of this application for membership, I agree that: 1.
There are certain inherent risks in skiing and that we agree to
hold Hidden Valley Ski Area/Skiing Enterprises Inc. harmless
on account of any injury incurred by me or my Family member
on the Hidden Valley Ski Area premises.314
The court determined it did not state defendant’s negligence is an inherent
risk of skiing and conspicuously identify the document as a liability waiver.315
Therefore, it does not bar plaintiffs’ claim alleging defendant negligently failed
to pad a ski lift tower causing their ten-year-old daughter’s death from a collision with it.316
Applying Yauger, a Wisconsin federal district court and the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals upheld waivers absolving the organizers of recreational sports
events from negligence liability for injuries suffered by participants.317 Each
document was clearly and conspicuously labeled as a “release and waiver of
liability” and expressly stated participants are accepting the risk of personal injury from the defendant’s negligence.318 Both courts recognized that a waiver
exempting a party from liability for personal injury caused by recklessness or
an intentional tort is void as against public policy.319

311

Id. at 60.
Id. at 64.
313
Id. at 63.
314
Id. at 61.
315
Id. at 64.
316
Id. at 61, 65.
317
Rose v. Nat’l Tractor Pullers Ass’n, 33 F. Supp. 2d 757, 762 (W.D. Wis. 1998); Niese v. Skip
Barber Racing Sch., 202 WI App 85 ¶ 6, 252 Wis. 2d 766, 642 N.W.2d 645.
318
Rose, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 727; Niese, 2002 WI App 85 ¶ 15.
319
Rose, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 766); Niese, 2002 WI App 85 ¶ 18.
312
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Subsequently, in Atkins v. Swimwest Family Fitness Center, 320 the Wisconsin Supreme Court characterized Yauger as establishing two “factors”321 relevant to the public policy analysis of liability waivers.322 It then added a third
factor, whether there was an “opportunity to bargain in regard to its terms,” 323
but created uncertainty by “not address[ing] whether a single objectionable factor is sufficient to invalidate an exculpatory clause.”324 Finding it was overly
broad because it may encompass an unenforceable reckless or intentional act, it
did “not provide adequate noti[ce] of [its] nature and significance,” and it did
not give the signatory an opportunity to negotiate its terms,325 the court invalidated the following liability waiver:
WAIVER RELEASE STATEMENT
I AGREE TO ASSUME ALL LIABILITY FOR MYSELF
WITHOUT REGARD TO FAULT, WHILE AT SWIMWEST
FAMILIY FITNESS CENTER. I FURTHER AGREE TO
HOLD HARMLESS SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER, OR
ANY OF ITS EMPLOYEES FOR ANY CONDITIONS OR
INJURY THAT MAY RESULT TO MYSELF WHILE AT
THE SWIMWEST FITNESS CENTER. I HAVE READ THE
FOREGOING AND UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENTS.326
Since Atkins was decided in 2005, there are no reported Wisconsin cases
upholding the validity of any sports-related liability waivers. In Cass v. American Home Assurance Co.,327 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that a release of liability stating the plaintiff does hereby release and forever discharge
defendant from liability for negligence does not bar plaintiff’s claim for injuries
caused by the negligent operation of a snowmobile by defendant’s employee.328

320

2005 WI 4, 277 Wis. 2d 303, 691 N.W.2d 334.
Id. at ¶ 26.
322
Id. at ¶ 27.
323
Id. at ¶ 26.
324
Id. at ¶ 36.
325
Id. at ¶¶ 19, 23, 25.
326
Id. at ¶ 47 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
327
2005 WI App 126, 284 Wis. 2d 572, 699 N.W.2d 254.
328
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3, 13.
321
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The court ruled this language “is not sufficiently clear, unambiguous, or unmistakable to release [defendant] from the alleged negligence,”329 although it stated
“CAUTION! READ BEFORE SIGNING. THIS DOCUMENT AFFECTS
YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS AND WILL BAR YOUR RIGHT TO SUE.”330 Thus,
sports-related personal injury liability waivers now may be de facto invalid per
se.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin federal and state courts have made
several important, and, in some cases, precedent-setting, contributions to American sports law jurisprudence. Their respective judicial decisions have significantly shaped the evolving legal framework that governs high school, college,
Olympic, and professional sports, as well as the resolution of sports-related intellectual property and tort issues. Hopefully this identification, synthesis, and
explanation of the sports law jurisprudence of the Seventh Circuit and Wisconsin will facilitate its future development in a consistent and predictable manner
that guides and influences the law governing sports in other jurisdictions.

329
330

Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 2.

